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Abstract
Recent Iterated Response (IR) models of prag-
matics conceptualize language use as a recur-
sive process in which agents reason about each
other to increase communicative efficiency.
These models are generally defined over com-
plete utterances. However, there is substantial
evidence that pragmatic reasoning takes place
incrementally during production and compre-
hension. We address this with an incremen-
tal IR model. We compare the incremental
and global versions using computational sim-
ulations, and we assess the incremental model
against existing experimental data and in the
TUNA corpus for referring expression genera-
tion, showing that the model can capture phe-
nomena out of reach of global versions.
1 Introduction
A number of recent Bayesian models of pragmat-
ics conceptualize language use as a recursive pro-
cess in which abstract speaker and listener agents
reason about each other to increase communica-
tive efficiency and enrich the meanings of the
utterances they hear in context-dependent ways
(Ja¨ger 2007, 2012; Franke 2009; Frank and Good-
man 2012; for overviews, see Franke and Ja¨ger
2014; Goodman and Frank 2016). For example,
in these models, pragmatic listeners reason, not
about the literal semantics of the utterances they
hear, but rather about pragmatic speakers reason-
ing about simpler listeners that are defined directly
in terms of the literal semantics. In this back-and-
forth, many phenomena characterized by Grice
(1975) as conversational implicatures emerge nat-
urally as probabilistic inferences.
In general, these iterated response (IR) mod-
els separate pragmatic reasoning from incremen-
tal processing, in that the calculations are done
in terms of complete utterances. However, there
is substantial evidence that pragmatic processing
is incremental: listeners venture pragmatic infer-
ences over the time-course of the utterances they
hear, which influences the choices that speakers
make. To address this, we develop an IR model
that is incremental in the sense that pragmatic rea-
soning takes place word-by-word (though the pro-
cess could be defined in terms of different linguis-
tic units, like morphemes or phrases).
A variant of this model was applied successfully
to pragmatic image captioning by Cohn-Gordon
et al. (2018); here we concentrate on its qual-
itative behavior and linguistic predictions. We
present computational experiments which demon-
strate that incremental and global pragmatics
make different predictions, and we show that a
speaker that incrementally makes pragmatically
informative choices arrives at an utterance which
is globally informative. We then argue that an in-
cremental model can account for two empirical
observations out of reach of a global model: (i)
the asymmetry between adjective–noun and noun–
adjective languages in over-informative referen-
tial behavior (Rubio-Ferna´ndez, 2016), and (ii) the
anticipatory implicatures arising from contrastive
modifiers (Sedivy, 2007). The first of these obser-
vations requires a model of language production,
while the second requires a model of language in-
terpretation, and as such these case studies serve to
demonstrate both aspects of incremental pragmat-
ics. Finally, we apply the model to the TUNA cor-
pus for referring expression generation (Gatt et al.,
2009), showing that it makes more realistic pre-
dictions about attributive modifiers than does its
global counterpart.
2 Iterated Response Models
We construct our model within the Rational
Speech Acts (RSA) paradigm (Frank and Good-
man, 2012; Goodman and Stuhlmu¨ller, 2013).
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RSA and its extensions have been applied to a
wide range of pragmatic phenomena, including
scalar implicatures (Frank et al., 2016; Potts et al.,
2016), manner implicatures (Bergen et al., 2016),
hyperbole (Kao et al., 2014), metaphor, and po-
liteness (Yoon et al., 2016). In addition, RSA can
be cast as a machine learning model, thereby al-
lowing us to study pragmatic reasoning in large
corpora and complex environments (Vogel et al.,
2013; Monroe and Potts, 2015; Monroe et al.,
2017; Andreas and Klein, 2016).
Standard RSA models are global in the sense
that the pragmatic reasoning is defined over com-
plete utterances. Speakers are conditional distri-
butions of the form P (u|w), while listeners are
of the form P (w|u), for an utterance u and state
w. We first present this global formulation (sec-
tion 2.1), and then we show how to reformulate it
so that utterances are sequences of linguistic units
u = [u1, . . . , un] and the core RSA reasoning is
applied to each step ui given [u1, . . . ui−1].
Figure 1 presents a running illustrative exam-
ple. We imagine there are three referents, a red
dress (R1), a blue dress (R2), and a red hat (R3).
We have a simple language composed of three ut-
terances, dress, red dress, and red object, each
with its expected semantics. For the RSA calcu-
lation, we make the background assumption that
the speaker and listener are playing a coordina-
tion game: they succeed to the extent that the lis-
tener can use the speaker’s utterance to identify the
speaker’s intended referent.
2.1 Global Pragmatics
We define our global RSA agents as follows:
LUTT0 (w|u) ∝ JuK(w) (1)
SUTT-GP1 (u|w) ∝ elog(L
UTT
0 (w|u))−cost(u) (2)
LUTT1 (w|u) ∝ SUTT-GP1 (u|w) (3)
Here, J·K is an interpretation function mapping
utterances to functions from referents to {0, 1}.
Thus, the literal listener LUTT0 is simply a proba-
bilistic version of the truth conditions established
by J·K; given an utterance u, LUTT0 evenly dis-
tributes probability mass to the worlds compatible
with u according to J·K.
The pragmatic speaker SUTT-GP1 is more sophis-
ticated than a literal agent, in that SUTT-GP1 reasons
about LUTT0 , taking message costs into account.
We take cost to be a language model, which could
either be estimated from data (higher probability
to attested utterances), derived from a grammar
(higher probability to grammatical utterances), or
simply assign longer utterances more cost. Intu-
itively, SUTT-GP1 prefers utterances which are not
only true but best convey to LUTT0 which world
the speaker is in. This is illustrated in figure 1b:
whereas all three messages are true of R1, SUTT-GP1
prefers red dress because it is the most specific. In
this sense, SUTT-GP1 is a model of a Gricean infor-
mative speaker.
The pragmatic listener LUTT1 in turn reasons
about what world state SUTT-GP1 must be in such
that the observed utterance was chosen, and thus
draws more refined inferences than LUTT0 . We see
this in figure 1b as well, with respect to dress and
red object. Whereas LUTT0 regards these messages
as completely ambiguous, LUTT1 (softly) disam-
biguates them: dress is heavily biased toward R2,
and red object is heavily biased toward R3. This
inference formalizes the intuitive reasoning that if
the speaker of red object had been referring to R1,
they would have used the more specific, informa-
tive red dress; their avoidance of this means they
must be referring to R3.
2.2 Incremental Pragmatics
In natural language, speakers and listeners pro-
duce and comprehend utterances segment by seg-
ment. For present purposes, we define this pro-
cess at the word level, but we emphasize that the
proposed approach extends both to sub-word seg-
ments (Cohn-Gordon et al., 2018) and to larger
syntactic units.
To approximate this incremental process, we
represent utterances as sequences of words and al-
low RSA-style reasoning to happen at the point of
production or comprehension of each word, in the
order they are uttered. We represent the end of an
utterance as a STOP token, so that the choice of
STOP as the next “word” represents the decision
that the utterance is complete.
Roughly speaking, we want to define lis-
tener models P (w|word, c) and speaker models
P (word|w, c), where c is a sequence of words
constituting the utterance so far. In order to do
this, we first must define an incremental semantics.
This incremental semantics is defined in terms of
a global semantics and the set of available com-
plete utterances. For any partial sequence c and
set of referents W , JcK(w) ∈ [0, 1] is the number
of full-utterance extensions of c true in w divided
J·K R1 R2 R3
dress 1 1 0
red dress 1 0 0
red object 1 0 1
cost
dress 0
red dress 0
red object 0
(a) Reference game.
LUTT0 R1 R2 R3
dress 0.5 0.5 0.0
red dress 1.0 0.0 0.0
red object 0.5 0.0 0.5
SUTT-GP1 dress red dress red object
R1 0.25 0.5 0.25
R2 1.0 0.0 0.0
R3 0.0 0.0 1.0
LUTT1 R1 R2 R3
dress 0.2 0.8 0
red dress 1.0 0.0 0.0
red object 0.2 0.0 0.8
(b) Global RSA.
dress : 0.43
R1 red : 0.57 dress : 0.67
object : 0.33
dress : 1.0
R2 red : 0.0 dress : 0.5
object : 0.5
dress : 0.0
R3 red : 1.0 dress : 0.0
object : 1.0
(c) Incremental RSA speaker predictions.
R1 : 0.36
red R2 : 0.00
R3 : 0.64
(d) Incremental RSA listener predictions upon hearing red.
SUTT-IP1 dress red dress red object
R1 0.42 0.38 0.20
R2 1.0 0.0 0.0
R3 0.0 0.0 1.0
(e) Incremental utterance-level predictions from SUTT-IP1 .
Figure 1: Illustrative example comparing global and incremental RSA. For ease of comparison to the global model,
we do not depict the STOP token for the incremental model.
by the number of possible extensions of c into full
utterances that are true of any world in W . Where
c is a full utterance, JcK(w) ∈ {0, 1} is as in the
global model; where c is a partial utterances, JcK
represents the biases created by c.
This is not the only possible way to define an
incremental semantics. One alternative is to de-
fine a probabilistic S0 or L0 directly (as in Cohn-
Gordon et al. 2018). We choose the method de-
fined above since it is as close as possible to a
standard truth-conditional semantics and thus per-
mits direct comparison. Furthermore, since our
incremental semantics can be generated from an
utterance-level semantics, only the latter needs to
be stipulated.
Just as the standard RSA model presented in
section 2.1 uses as global semantics to define suc-
cessive speakers and listeners, we can now define
an incremental literal listener LWORD0 and incre-
mental pragmatic speaker and listener SWORD1 and
LWORD1 :
LWORD0 (w|c,word) ∝ Jc+ wordK(w) (4)
SWORD1 (word|c, w) ∝
elog(L
WORD
0 (w|c,word))−cost(word)
(5)
LWORD1 (w|c,word) ∝ SWORD1 (word|c, w) (6)
Figure 1c summarizes the reasoning of the in-
cremental pragmatic speaker SWORD1 , assuming
0 cost on all words for simplicity. This agent
prefers red as a first word when conveying R1:
SWORD1 (red|c = [], w = R1) = 0.57. However,
if R3 is the intended referent, the agent must begin
its utterance with red (since hat is not an avail-
able word in this simple example). As shown in
figure 1d, this fact allows the pragmatic listener
to infer from hearing red that the referent is most
likely R3: LWORD1 (R3|c = [], red) = 0.64.
There may be cases in which there is no pos-
sible true continuation of a sequence of words
into a true utterance. For instance, no continu-
ation of red constitutes a truthful description of
R2. In such situations, we say that probabil-
ity is evenly distributed over all choices of word,
so that SWORD1 (dress|c = [red ], w = R2 ) =
SWORD1 (object |c = [red ], w = R2 ) = 0.5.
2.3 An Utterance-level Incremental Speaker
From the word level agent SWORD1 , we can use
the chain rule to obtain SUTT-IP1 , an utterance-level
speaker whose values are the result of incremental
pragmatic inferences:1
SUTT-IP1 (u|w) =
n∏
i=1
SWORD1 (ui|c = [u1 . . . ui−1], w)
(7)
Whereas SUTT-GP1 in (2) makes pragmatic calcu-
lations on the basis of whole utterances, SUTT-IP1
makes incremental pragmatic decisions about each
choice of word, which together also give rise to a
distribution over utterances.
This allows for an efficient strategy,
namely greedy unrolling, to generate an
utterance from a referent r. We choose
the first word word1 of the utterance to be
argmaxword S
WORD
1 (word |w = r, c = []), and
this decision then becomes part of the con-
text for choosing the second word: word2 is
argmaxword S
WORD
1 (word |w = r, c = [word1]).
And so on through the entire utterance.
2.4 Relating the Global and Incremental
Models
Figure 2 depicts the core relationships between the
global and local models, focusing on the prag-
matic speaker. The agents along the solid green
path define the global model of section 2.1, while
those along the dashed red path define the incre-
mental model of section 2.2 as defined by SUTT-IP1 .
Importantly, while SUTT-GP1 and S
UTT-IP
1 are of the
same type, in the sense of being conditional prob-
ability distributions over full utterances, they are
not the same distribution.
For instance, the predictions of SUTT-IP1 for our
illustrative example are given in figure 1e. Com-
paring them with the global pragmatic speaker
predictions in figure 1b, we see that the two make
1We use u[n] for the nth element of a list u, and u[: n]
for the sublist of u up to but not including u[n].
full : sem LUTT0 S1
UTT-X
inc : sem LWORD0 S
WORD
1
Figure 2: Two ways of constructing an utterance-
level pragmatic speaker from a semantics. The solid
green path is to obtain a literal listener over full utter-
ances and then perform pragmatics, which gives rise to
SUTT-GP1 while the dashed red path is to obtain an incre-
mental literal listener, use it to construct a word-level
pragmatic speaker from LWORD0 and then use this to de-
fine an utterance-level pragmatic speaker, SUTT-IP1 .
substantively different predictions. In the global
model, the speaker who wishes to refer to R1
prefers red dress. In contrast, in the incremental
model, the speaker referring to R1 prefers dress.
The reason for SUTT-IP1 having these values is that
saying dress ensures the termination of the utter-
ance (given the set of utterances that are available
in this example), which therefore has probability
1.0 at the next time step, while saying red leaves
two options, dress and object. Thus, SUTT-GP1 and
SUTT-IP1 are not only quantitatively different, but
even differ in their predictions about which utter-
ances are optimal.
Figure 3 provides an abstract example which
further reinforces this difference. Moving from
left to right, the numbers in green depict the
SWORD1 probabilities at each of the two steps in the
generation of a complete utterance, when the tar-
get reference is W1 instead of distractor W2. The
probability of the full utterance at SUTT-IP1 is the
product of the two SWORD1 steps.
An example of the difference to SUTT-GP1 is
shown in green. When referring to W1, SUTT-GP1
gives equal weight to AA, BA and BB. SUTT-IP1 ,
however, first chooses between A and B: in this
decision, B is preferred, since one of the two con-
tinuations of A, namely AB, is not compatible with
W1. However, if A is chosen, the subsequent
choice is fully determined to be B (p(A|[A],W1 =
1.0). This results in a preference for AA.
While we focus largely on the differences be-
tween incremental and global pragmatics, it is
worth highlighting a regard in which the former
behaves like the latter.
Given a referent r, call an utterance u weakly
Figure 3: A depiction of the probabilities of the SUTT-IP1 in red and S
UTT-GP
1 in green, for a simple abstract example.
The four utterances are AA, AB, BA and BB, while the two worlds are W1 and W2. The semantics assigns u = W1
and w = AB to 0 but all other utterance–world pairs to 1. Given a world w, the incremental speaker first chooses
the first letter to be A or B, and then chooses the second letter conditioned jointly on w and the first letter, to
obtain a full utterance. The resulting full utterance probabilities are compared with the predictions of the global
SUTT-GP1 . As can be seen, the incremental and global speakers assign different probabilities to each utterance and
are consequently distinct from each other.
informative if LUTT0 (r|u) ≥ 1|W | , where W is the
set of possible referents. In other words, given
u, the literal listener LUTT0 will guess the correct
referent with probability at least at chance (when
costs are 0). We note that the utterance u∗r ob-
tained by greedy unrolling at each step of gener-
ation, as described in section 2.3, is weakly in-
formative. To see this, observe that the nth word
of u∗r is argmaxword SWORD1 (word |w = r, c =
u ∗r [: n]). Since at each step SWORD1 produces a
word which, at worst, does not rule out any refer-
ents for LWORD0 , the resulting sentence u∗ at worst
gives LUTT0 (r|u∗r) ≥ 1|W | . In other words, greed-
ily unrolling the incremental speaker will produce
an utterance which is true and has the literal lis-
tener infer the probability of the intended referent
as being at least at chance.
This result suggests that the strategy of choos-
ing the most informative word (or syntactic unit)
at each point in the generation of an utterance can
be used as a substitute for choosing, from all ut-
terances, the one which is most informative. Ex-
ploring the gap in this informativity bound is an
important future direction.
One potential advantage of SUTT-IP1 as a plausi-
ble model of referring expression generation (over
a small, discrete set of referents) is computational
tractability in real-world settings where the set of
possible utterances U is large or unbounded. In
such settings, SUTT-GP1 becomes intractable, owing
to the normalizing term required over U .
However, it is important to note that in the setup
presented here, SUTT-IP1 is not more tractable than
SUTT-GP1 . The reason for this is that the calculation
of the incremental semantics depends on factoring
the global semantics: this involves an intractable
normalization akin to that present in the SUTT-GP1 .
Thus, SUTT-IP1 is only computationally tractable if
the incremental semantics in terms of which it is
defined is tractable. In the present work, we de-
fine an incremental semantics in terms of a global
one, in order to allow for a maximally clear com-
parison between the global and incremental mod-
els of pragmatics that ensue. However, an incre-
mental semantics (or literal speaker model) can be
defined or learned independently, as in Vedantam
et al. 2017 and Cohn-Gordon et al. 2018.
3 Application to Prior Experiments
We now briefly consider two cases where incre-
mental pragmatics provides an explanation of a
phenomenon where global pragmatics does not
seem to suffice.
3.1 Over-informative Referring Expressions
It has been observed that, when generating re-
ferring expressions (REs), humans often provide
more information than necessary to refer unam-
biguously (Engelhardt et al., 2006; Herrmann and
Deutsch, 1976). For instance, Rubio-Ferna´ndez
(2016) shows that English speakers often use re-
dundant color terms (e.g., the red dress) in a scene
with only a single dress, where the shorter ut-
terance dress would suffice. However, Rubio-
Ferna´ndez also notes that Spanish speakers are
less likely to over-describe with the analogous re-
ferring expression, el vestido rojo, in the same sit-
uation. This difference is a challenge for non-
incremental pragmatic accounts, since, ceteris
paribus, we would expect semantically equivalent
Spanish and English REs to have the same produc-
tion probability.
Using incremental pragmatics, we model the
English case as follows: let the referents be a red
dress (R1) and a blue hat (R2), and the possible
utterances be dress, red dress, hat, and blue hat,
with the obvious semantics.
We make the following assumption regarding
the cost term: assume a cost of 1.0 for all words
but a cost of 0.0 for the STOP token. Further as-
sume that an utterance’s cost is the sum of the cost
of its words. The effect of this cost term is to pe-
nalize longer utterances, all else being equal.
On these assumptions, the globally pragmatic
speaker SUTT-GP1 prefers dress to red dress,
since both are fully informative but the lat-
ter is costlier: SUTT-GP1 (dress|R1) = 0.73 >
SUTT-GP1 (red dress|R1) = 0.27. Meanwhile the in-
cremental pragmatic speaker SUTT-IP1 is undecided:
SUTT-IP1 (dress|R1) = SUTT-IP1 (red dress|R1) =
0.5. The increase in mass on the over-informative
RE red dress in SUTT-IP1 as compared to S
UTT-GP
1
is the result of incremental processing: the deci-
sion between red and dress is made on the basis
of informativity, and both words are equally in-
formative. However, if red is chosen, the subse-
quent, now over-informative word dress has to fol-
low, since red on its own is not an utterance.
We explore the generality of this dynamic – that
incremental pragmatics may lead to the language
model being compelled to produce longer utter-
ances – in section (4), where we apply the model
to real-world data, in the form of the TUNA cor-
pus.
However, this effect does not obtain in Spanish,
where adjectives are post-nominal. In the Span-
ish case, let our utterances be vestido, vestido rojo,
sombrero, and sombrero azul, with the same refer-
ents and costs as before. Then there is no differ-
ence between the global and incremental models:
SUTT-GP1 (vestido|R1) = 0.73 >
SUTT-GP1 (vestido rojo|R1) = 0.27
SUTT-IP1 (vestido|R1) = 0.73 >
SUTT-IP1 (vestido rojo|R1) = 0.27
When choosing the word to follow vestido, the in-
cremental pragmatic speaker has no need to say
rojo rather than STOP, since the goal of communi-
cating the referent has already been completed by
vestido. As a result, the speaker chooses the less
costly option, STOP. The relevant difference here
from the English case is that it is grammatical to
stop after the first word (since the first word is a
noun, not an adjective as in English).
A qualitative property which this example illus-
trates is a dislike in SUTT-IP1 for utterances which
begin with a sequence of words which would mis-
lead the incremental literal listener LWORD0 . This
is the basis on which anticipatory implicatures are
formed, as discussed in section 3.2. This is not a
hard constraint: utterances which would initially
mislead an incremental listener are not categori-
cally ruled out. However, the question of whether
this behavior is empirically justified is a worth-
while topic for future investigation.
3.2 Anticipatory Implicatures
We now turn to a phenomenon concerning lan-
guage interpretation, which we will model with an
RSA listener, LWORD1 .
Sedivy (2007) provides compelling empirical
evidence that humans draw pragmatic inferences
partway through utterances. For instance, when
shown a scene with a tall cup, a tall pitcher, a short
cup, and a key, a listener who hears “Give me the
tall–” will fixate on the tall cup before the utter-
ance is complete.
We take this as evidence for an incremental
pragmatic listener LWORD1 which can calculate an
implicature by reasoning that, had the speaker in-
tended to refer to the pitcher, they would not have
had any motivation to say “tall”. By contrast, on
the assumption that the speaker’s referent is the tall
cup, the contrastive modifier serves to distinguish
the intended referent from the short cup.
To model this implicature formally, we make
the simplifying assumption that the possible ut-
terances are tall cup, short cup, tall pitcher, cup,
pitcher, and key. For consistency with the previ-
ous example, we assume the additive cost function
from section 3.1.
On hearing tall as the first word of an ut-
terance, LWORD1 , the incremental pragmatic lis-
tener, can draw the following inference: the in-
tended referent is likely to have been the tall cup,
since had it been the tall pitcher, there would
have been no need to use the contrastive modifier
tall: LWORD1 (the pitcher|c = [], tall) = 0.4 while
LWORD1 (the tall glass|c = [], tall) = 0.6.
This implicature is cancelable, and indeed, were
the next word to be pitcher, we would exclude all
referents but the pitcher. In this respect, the model
represents the confusion created by uttering “tall
pitcher”, where after the first word of the utter-
ance, the majority of probability mass is on a ref-
erent (the tall cup) which, after the second word,
has no probability mass.
4 Experimental Validation with TUNA
In order to observe the behavior of our incremen-
tal pragmatic model on real data, we make use
of the TUNA corpus (van Deemter et al., 2006).
TUNA is built around a referring expression task
grounded in images. The images are coded using
a fixed set of attributes, and the human-produced
utterances are coded using the same attributes.
Thus, TUNA lets us study the core content of natu-
rally produced referring expressions without forc-
ing us to confront the full complexity of natural
language.
Our goal is to show that, when a cost is imposed
which prefers shorter utterances, the incremental
model SUTT-IP1 is less affected, and on average pro-
duces more two-word utterances than SUTT-GP1 .
We hypothesize this on the basis of the prefer-
ence of SUTT-IP1 for utterances where the choice of
each word is made with high certainty. This means
that informative one-word utterances which have
reasonable probability of being extended with a
second word will score lower than two-word ut-
terances where the choice of the first word all but
fixes the choice of the second. Since most one-
word utterances admit the possibility of an exten-
sion to a second word, this dynamic would re-
sult in a preference for the longer, two-word ut-
terances. This would provide further evidence that
Figure 4: An example target entity from the furniture
domain, along with its coding as a dictionary, and the
human generated referring expression for it in a context
of other images.
the dynamic described in section 3.1 generalizes
from an idealized example to real language.
4.1 Data
The TUNA corpus defines a reference game in the
sense of figure 1a. Each trial contains a set of im-
ages (entities), of which one or several are the tar-
get, and a human-generated referring expression
for the target in the context of all the images. We
refer to the full set of target and non-target entities
as the context set.
Both images and utterances are coded as sets of
attributes (figure 4). This coding defines a seman-
tics. For instance, in figure 4, the utterance “the
grey desk” is true of the entity, since type:desk
and colour:grey are included in its attributes.
For the furniture domain, attributes such as color,
object type, and size are coded. The people do-
main is more complex, coding for more attributes,
including age, clothing, hair color, glasses, and
orientation. Both domains also code for the po-
sition of the image relative to the other images in
the context set.
4.2 Methods
For simplicity, we restrict our model to the furni-
ture and people domains where only a single ref-
erent is provided, and consider only utterances of
two words or fewer. These constitute 32% of the
total utterances in the single referent corpora, and
to our knowledge are not distinct in other ways
than their length.
For each trial, the possible utterances are those
from the set of all two-word utterances across the
entire corpus (either of furniture or people) which
are compatible with at least one of the entities
in the trial. We predict the set of optimal utter-
ances (since there may be more than one utter-
ance with maximum probability) for both SUTT-GP1
and SUTT-IP1 . For our cost function, we assume
all words have a cost of 1.0 except the STOP to-
ken, which has cost 0.0. Utterances cost the sum
of their words. This has the effect of penalizing
longer utterances.
For each trial, we have a set of entities as ref-
erents, with the designated target identified among
these entities. In addition, we can define the set of
all possible true utterances for a given trial. Thus,
it is possible to make predictions according to both
SUTT-GP1 and S
UTT-IP
1 for each trial without having
to enrich the TUNA dataset in any way.
4.3 Results
As expected, we find a preference for longer utter-
ances; out of the 114 people trials, SUTT-GP1 iden-
tifies 120 two-word utterances as optimal, com-
pared to 287 for SUTT-IP1 . In the 83 trials of the
furniture domain, SUTT-GP1 marks 88 two word ut-
terances as optimal, compared to 149 for SUTT-IP1 .
(More than one utterance may be optimal for a
given trial, in the event that multiple utterances
have the same, maximal probability of being cho-
sen.)
An example of a representative case is the trial
where the entity in figure 4 is the target, and
no other distractors are grey, although others are
desks. In this case, both “grey” and “a grey desk”
are fully informative, in the sense of only being
compatible with the target. With the cost term
having the effect of penalizing longer utterances,
SUTT-GP1 chooses “grey” as optimal. For S
UTT-IP
1 ,
however, neither of these utterances are optimal,
because probability is divided between stopping
after “grey” and continuing with “desk”. Instead,
the optimal utterance, “right middle”, describes
the position of the target among the images of the
context set. “Right” is not an available full utter-
ance (as it is not attested in the data) and so no
probability mass is lost by being divided between
stopping and continuing with “middle”.
While this result offers a possible motivation for
over-informative behavior, the nature of the rela-
tion is clearly nuanced – two-word utterances are
not always more informative than one-word utter-
ances – and merits further work. In particular, it
would be desirable to use a more direct proxy for
over-informativity than preference for longer ut-
terances.
5 Conclusion
In summary, we have defined a formal notion of
incremental pragmatics, with respect to both pro-
duction and comprehension, and shown that it dif-
fers in meaningful ways from global pragmatic be-
havior, at least within the RSA paradigm. The
core differences are the sensitivity to word order,
which varies cross-linguistically in a way which
core pragmatic reasoning does not, and the ability
of an incremental model to calculate implicatures
partway through an utterance. We compared these
models using simulations, and we assessed them
using existing psycholinguistic data and using a
new experiment with the TUNA corpus.
Exploration of RSA as a machine learning
model is now underway, and this is helping to
show the value of pragmatic reasoning in impor-
tant NLP tasks. Such work forces us to confront
the fact that the idealized RSA speaker agent must
reason about all possible utterances – the normal-
ization constant in (3) demands this. Prior work
has sought to get around this by simplifying the
space of possible utterances (Monroe and Potts,
2015) or by sampling a small set of utterances
to approximate this normalization (Andreas and
Klein, 2016; Monroe et al., 2017). Neither solu-
tion is ideal. The incremental approach offers a
scalable alternative, as long as the incremental se-
mantics is learned, as in Cohn-Gordon et al. 2018
and Vedantam et al. 2017.
There is also much to be done in assessing
the incremental model in the context of on-line
sentence processing. We have begun to identify
the key properties of the model, but the degree
to which these properties accord with empirical
data on production and comprehension remains a
largely open question.
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